On the other hand, developing countries had little influence, although many were skeptical at first about the proposals and opposition to a TRIPS agreement was gradually overcome (Drahos, 2002). The promise of better access to the agriculture and textile markets, economic constraints from the threat of U.S. sanctions, the possible development of restrictive bilateral agreements on public emigration, and a general lack of awareness of the content of the proposals played their part (May-Sell, 2006: 157-158). As a result, TRIPS has reduced the interests of some of the company`s global players, and it is only by recognizing it that it can be well understood (Matthews, 2002: 4-5). This is the specific view of intellectual property, as promoted by Western multinationals and supported by governments embedded in the agreement. The subtle balance between private profit and the common good – the purpose and extent of intellectual property – has therefore been too low to the detriment of ip, and the consequences of how TRIPS operate despite their stated objectives are what we are now turning to. The available term of protection is at least ten years (Article 26.3). The text provides, for example, that the term can be divided into two five-year periods. It is also essential to point out that the concept of intellectual property, as contained in the TRIPS AGREEMENT, is based on a particular interpretation of intellectual property rights that has developed in recent decades within the Western tradition.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the G77 first focused on intellectual property as an international problem, when they attempted, as part of the advance of a new international economic order, to weaken the protection of existing intellectual property rights in order to reduce the technological deficit with industrialized countries (May and May 2006: 155-156). But the debate has also spurred several players in the United States – and to a lesser extent in Europe and Japan – who were increasingly concerned about losses from counterfeit trafficking. The agreement also recognises the divergent position of Member States with regard to their relative economic status, administrative capacities and technological base. As in other WTO agreements, developing countries have received special and differentiated treatment, in accordance with Part VI of the agreement, under “transitional arrangements”. While developed countries had to ensure compliance until 1 January 1996, developing and post-communist countries themselves gave themselves four more years to achieve this (with an additional five years for new patented products). In accordance with Article 66.1, the least developed countries (LDCs) had the opportunity to adopt the TRIPS agreement until 2006, with the possibility of further extensions; The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health in 2001 subsequently authorized an additional ten years for medicines for least developed countries (WTO, 2001). Article 66.2 now expressly advocates the transfer of technology from developed to least developed countries to support the creation of a viable technological base, and Article 67 requires developed countries to provide technical and financial assistance to facilitate the implementation of the agreement.